Kamis, 08 Mei 2014

Culturalism and Understanding of Culture

[Series Index]

Propagandist poster symbolizing the Lusitania.
(source)
A sinking ship has been a subject of romanticized tragedy for at least a century, going back to the Lusitania and the Titanic. In a large part, this treatment of maritime disasters happens because a sinking ship is such a perfect vehicle for a narrative. A ship is a self-contained civilization, constantly exposed to the apocalyptic possibility for any number of reasons. Those reasons, eventually, become the story of each sinking. The Lusitania is remembered as a story about German aggression; the Titanic, a story about human hubris. If the story's devices include the death of hundreds of young school children, it can only be more compelling.

So, inevitably, the tragic sinking of the Sewol became another story. Initially, much of the story revolved around the captain's criminal dereliction of duty, as he was seen--as the world was watching--abandoning the ship without any concern for the passengers. But in a matter of days, the story turned into the one about Korean culture--how its Confucianism made its children too unthinking and obedient to save themselves when the ship's PA system instructed them to stay in their cabins as the ship was sinking. 

In the wake of the Asiana plane crash last year, I discussed the concept of culturalism, which I defined as "unwarranted impulse to explain people's behavior with a 'cultural difference,' whether real or imagined." I tried to show that the fountainhead of cultural explanation for airplane crashes, i.e. one chapter in Malcolm Gladwell's Outlier, was based on shoddy reasoning founded upon cherry-picked evidence. Then I explained the danger of culturalism: it obfuscates the truth, distracts from the real issue, and wipes away the individuality of the people who are "explained" through culture.

This time, before I could comment, several writers produced excellent pieces of writing that persuasively argued against the reductionist claims about Korean culture and the Sewol disaster. The best ones came from John Bocskay and Jakob Dorof--you should read them. Because Bocskay and Dorof did such an excellent job refuting the reductionist, "Korean culture sinks ships" claim, I feel that I should not belabor the point.

Instead, I will address a different angle. As to my Asiana article and the Sewol-related articles by Bocskay and Dorof, the objections were the same: culture is real, and it exerts real force on human decisions. When I presented my critique of culturalism in the context of the Asiana flight crash, most of the objections, in so many words, said there really was a cultural difference in communication patterns, which may well affect airline safety. Likewise, to articles by Bocskay and Dorof, many objected by claiming that culture clearly impacted the way in which the Sewol disaster unfolded, and it is not only incorrect, but also willfully blind, to say otherwise.

But such objections miss the point completely, since neither I nor Bocskay and Dorof argued that there was no such thing as culture or cultural differences. Recall that the definition of culturalism is "unwarranted impulse to explain people's behavior with a 'cultural difference.'" In my original piece about culturalism as well as in my subsequent discussion, I stressed repeatedly that cultural explanations have their place. I have little doubt that Bocskay and Dorof would agree with me in saying that culture is real, and it impacts human actions.

This leads to a natural question:  if culture is real, then what separates a cultural explanation from a culturalist one? 

(More after the jump.)

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

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When people offer an explanation based on "Korean culture," not simply in regards to the Sewol disaster but in general, I often find that the speaker is not entirely clear on what she means by "Korean culture." As far as I can tell, the definition of "Korean culture" in those explanation oscillates between two different poles of meanings.

In certain cases, "Korean culture" denotes a type of unchanging, indelible essence, common to Koreans and only Koreans. In this sense, "Korean culture" commands the actions of every Korean who has ever lived, past, present and future. It dictates the decisions of any Korean who has ever lived in any part of the world, be she a Korean in Busan whose family never left the city for a thousand years, or a Korean-Chinese whose family migrated outside of Korea more than a hundred years ago. It is obvious that this definition is no more than disguised racism, with "culture" serving as another dog whistle. Any "cultural" explanation based on this definition holds little explanatory power, as it collapses under its own weight.

In other cases, "Korean culture" is a shorthand for any commonly observable pattern of thoughts or behavior in Korea or among Koreans. As a shorthand, "Korean culture" amounts to little more than the sum of its highly diverse parts. "Korean culture," in this sense, is divisible to nearly infinite number of sub- and sub-sub-cultures upon a closer look. One can speak of Korea's corporate culture, culinary culture, pop culture, political culture, maritime culture, school culture, familial culture, Internet culture, youth culture, regional culture. Sometimes, these sub-cultures and sub-sub-cultures point to the same direction; at other times, they either subtly diverge, or actively clash with one another.

I believe that the second definition is the correct way of understanding culture. When I say "culture is real and exerts real influence," I am employing this definition. I do so because the difference between the first definition of "Korean culture" and the second definition of "Korean culture" is plain. The first definition is a yoke on Koreans, reducing them to unthinking automatons; the second definition is merely a descriptor, a shorthand that we are forced to use even though the shorthand never does justice to the real thing. The bodies of water that cover 71 percent of the Earth's surface include both extreme depth and extreme height, extreme heat and extreme cold, extremely large creatures and the extremely small ones. Yet we are forced to call them all "the ocean," for the sake of manageable brevity. Likewise, we may refer to "Korean culture" without losing sight of the fact that the vastness and complexity of hundreds of millions of actions taken by hundreds of millions of people every second can never be truly reducible to those two words.

One way of understanding culturalism is:  it is the moment at which the second, expansive definition of culture is tainted by the first, reductionist definition of culture. In most cases, the term "culture," as used by those who explain events by way of culture, represents a varying level of mixture of the two definitions. Importantly, those who offer the cultural explanations rarely understand the precise definition of the term "culture" that they employ, i.e. their exact location relative to the two poles. Like much of the racism in the world, culturalism is expressed not through active malice, but through unthinking deference to subconscious bias.

But regardless of whether the speaker is aware of his own bias, we know that much of the cultural explanations floating in the world are infected by culturalism, a form of bias. We can see this in the manner in which cultural explanations are offered. Fans of cultural explanations exhort that it is eminently fair to consider whether culture contributed to certain events. But the manner in which cultural explanations are employed gives a lie to this claim, since the applications of cultural explanations are anything but fair.

We know, for example, that the facts that do not fit the pre-existing stereotypes about Korea are rarely explained by way of Korean culture. This is a significant data point, for the term "stereotype" may well be another way of describing the reductionist understanding of culture. Several of the Sewol's junior crew members died as heroes, saving as many school children as they could before they perished. But there is little discussion about how Korean culture impelled those crew members to selflessly give their lives. If it is so eminently fair to cite culture as a significant contributor of human actions, why is such heroism not hailed a cultural achievement by Koreans?

Any part of Korean culture that that does not fit the stereotype about Korean culture is also disregarded. The culturalist explanation about the Sewol tragedy revolved around the supposed "Korean culture of obedience." But Korea marched from fascist dictatorship to democracy through relentless resistance and protests against the authority. A significant part of that protesting tradition of Korea involved young students, right around the age of the Danwon High School students who perished on the Sewol. If it is so eminently fair to introduce culture to explain behavior, why is one part of the national culture prioritized over another?

We also know that a cultural explanation overwhelmingly is more likely to emerge regarding a disaster in Asia or involving Asians (Fukushima, the Asiana crash or the Sewol sinking) compared to a disaster in North America or Europe (Katrina, Deep Water Horizon, Santiago de Compostela derailment.) This, too, indicates bias: cultural explanation is overwhelmingly more likely to appear when something happens in a faraway land to inscrutable people. The same question may be asked:  If it is so eminently fair to cite culture as a significant contributor of disasters, where are all the cultural explanations that expound on how American culture contributed to the bumbling response after the Hurricane Katrina, how British culture contributed the BP oil rig explosion, or how Spanish culture is to blame for the massive train derailment?

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Here, a short detour. The last point requires further discussion, because of this common objection: the claim that Americans and Europeans engage in cultural examinations of themselves all the time, chief example of which is the gun culture of America. This is a rather weak claim; it is plain that there is significantly less willingness to explain events that happen in America and Europe in terms of culture. (Again: where are all the cultural explanations that explain how British culture contributed to the BP oil disaster?)

To the extent that this weak objection has a grain of truth, it only serves to illuminate the difference between the two definitions of culture that come into play in a cultural explanation. For it is clear that "culture" in the context of Americans' discussions of "America's gun culture" refers to the expansive definition of "culture." When Americans discuss their own country's gun culture, absolutely no American thinks that the word "America" in "America's gun culture" serves to bind all Americans, or even a majority of Americans. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that when Americans speak of how Americans need to fix their gun culture, they are quietly whispering to themselves:  "except me."

The same is true for a similar objection:  the claim that Koreans constantly point to their own culture to explain the events in Korea--if Koreans themselves can use cultural explanation, why not us? But when Koreans are critiquing their own culture, the same silent whisper is constantly present:  "except me." When a non-Korean repeats Koreans' criticism of their own culture, the silent whisper of "except me" takes on a very different meaning. An "except me" uttered by a member of a culture speaking of her own culture serves to limit the applicability of "culture"; the same uttered by someone outside of that culture does the opposite.

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To return to the earlier point: none of this is intended to say that there is no such thing as culture. Culture is real, and it exerts real influence on people. What, then, can one do to talk about culture while avoiding the pitfalls of culturalism?

Judging from the experience of running a moderately successful blog about Korean culture, what I have found effective is to directly address the components of culture. After all, "culture" is a shorthand, containing a vast array of multitudes. An effective exposition of culture would necessarily be an unpacking of that shorthand.

I deliberately chose to write this post within the series after the post about the causes and contributing factors of the Sewol tragedy. My first priority in writing the second part of the series was to provide a concise summary of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy. But I also had a secondary aim:  I was trying to show just how much of the tragedy I could explain without any explicit reference to the word "culture." So the post included discussions about lax regulation by a neoliberal government, unchecked greed by a struggling corporation that led to a distorted business model, potential corruption and all-around incompetence.

I am humbled that the post was very well received; I am yet to see any criticism that the lack of express reference to culture somehow leaves the post incomplete. (To the contrary, many of the positive reviews for my post praised it for being "complete.") However, my post is still a thoroughly cultural piece, as it discusses many different cultural trends that one can encounter in Korea. Years of neoliberal economic reforms led to an unstable labor market, which fostered a culture of hapless dependency among the incompetent crew of Sewol. Lack of adequate disaster training bred a culture of amateurism within Korea's disaster response system, although their effort must be praised. At many junctures, large and small safety regulations were ignored, implying at a weak culture for public safety.

But how much would my post improve, had I chosen to explain the tragedy in those terms? How would the explanation become better by filtering everything through the word "culture," which inevitably invites a reductionist interpretation? In my estimation, this is simply the better way of explaining a foreign culture: break it down to its components, by presenting the facts and circumstances that gave rise to that particular pattern of behavior. Aim for true empathy and understanding by suggesting that, if you encountered the same facts and circumstances, you would do the same. I do not always succeed in doing this, but it has always been the guiding principle for this blog. The modicum of readership that this blog has enjoyed seems to say that I am not alone in the opinion that this is the better approach.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Kamis, 01 Mei 2014

The Sewol Tragedy: Part II - Causes and Contributing Factors

[Series Index]

[NOTE:  I finished writing the first draft of this post on April 30, 2014. Since then, additional facts have been uncovered. I will periodically update this post as I learn new, relevant facts.]

The Sewol. The ferry company's logo ("Chonghaejin") is also visible.
(source)

The sinking of the Sewol is a terrible disaster that was entirely preventable. Instead, a confluence of numerous circumstances, people and their decisions resulted in the senseless destruction of more than 300 lives, overwhelming majority of whom were young high school students, about to enter the prime of their lives.

What caused the sinking of Sewol? What contributed to those deaths? The best way to answer these questions is to sort out the actions of the important parties involved at important junctures.

In this accident, there are three significant actors:
  • The captain and the crew, who was immediately responsible for the ship and the passengers;
  • Cheonghaejin Marine Co., the ferry company in charge of maintaining and operating the ship, and; 
  • The government, which played a dual role of the regulator and the rescuer. 
There are four significant segments of time:
  1. Before the accident; 
  2. Between when the Sewol set sail and when it began to list; 
  3. Approximately 40 minutes between when the ship began to list, and 
  4. After the rescue efforts began. 
When we examine how these three actors behaved in the four segments of time, we begin to have an understanding of what could have prevented this tragedy.

THE ACTORS

The Crew

There were 33 crew members on the Sewol. Out of the 33, 15 were the senior crew members who were in charge of steering and operating the ship (as opposed to, say, manning the snack bar or providing customer service.) The 15 include: 69-year-old Captain Lee Jun-seok [이준석], two First Mates, one Second Mate, one Third Mate, three Helmsmen, three Engineers and four Assistant Engineers. The other 18 were junior crew members, which included stewards, an event planner and custodians. All 15 senior crew members were in the bridge when the ship began sinking; all 15 survived. Out of the 29, 20 crew members survived--a rate vastly superior to the survival rate of the entire ship (174 out of 476) or that of the Danwon High School students (75 out of 325). Currently, seven out of the 15 senior crew members are under arrest pending investigation.

Because the 15 senior crew members bore the responsibility for the steering and operation of the ship, this post will only focus on them. When I refer to "the Crew" from this point on, I am referring to the 15 senior crew members.

The Company

Cheonghaejin [청해진] Marine Co. (alternately romanized as "Chonghaejin") is the largest coastline ferry company in Korea. Cheonghaejin was established in 1999; its name is for the famous historical seaside fortress in the southwestern part of Korea. Cheonghaejin operates three lines with four ships, and operates the water taxi on the Han River in Seoul.

The distinction of being the largest coastline ferry company in Korea is less impressive than it sounds. In terms of efficiency, passenger ferry is no match for high speed rails and low cost airlines. Thus, Korea's coastline ferry companies tend to be small, and the profit margin thin. Cheonghaejin was a small-ish mid-size company that has been losing money for the last several years.

The Incheon-Jeju line, however, was a moneymaker for Cheonghaejin. Cheonghaejin has a monopoly on the Incheon-Jeju line, for which it operated two ships: the Omahana and the Sewol. Cheonghaejin made significant investment to create the monopoly. Even as Cheonghaejin was losing money, it had spent more than $14 million in purchasing and modifying the Sewol in 2012. With two ships, Cheonghaejin was able to set sail five times a week, absorbing all demand for the line and freezing out other ferry companies.

The line was particularly lucrative because Jeju, a large island, consistently required supplies from the mainland. Although both the Omahana and the Sewol were passenger ships, they were also able to carry trucks and container cargoes. Doing so came with an additional price advantage: because the two ships were technically passenger ferries, they were exempt from the fees that the Jeju seaport charged on cargo ships. Essentially, Cheonghaejin was making up the decreased demand in passenger ferry by doubling as a bootleg cargo carrier.

Cheonghaejin's revenue from 2008 to 2013.
Unit = KRW 1M (~US$1,000).
Blue line represents income from passengers; red line represents same from freight.
(source)

Cheonghaejin is ultimately owned by 73-year-old Yoo Byeong-eon. In addition to overseeing a small corporate empire, Yoo's day job included being a pastor for a Christianity-derivative cult called the Saviorists [구원파]. (I previously covered the Saviorist cult in this blog. For those living in New York: they are the creepy Asian people in orange t-shirts talking about "Bible Crusade.") Currently, Yoo and his cronies are under investigation for embezzlement and bribery.

The Government

President Park Geun-hye's administration is entering its second full year. The previous administration was led by President Lee Myeong-bak, who was also a conservative like his successor. In the area of economic policies, President Lee was the most neoliberal president that Korea has ever had. Like America's Republican presidents after which he modeled himself, President Lee pushed for lower taxes, privitization and deregulation. The Park administration was content to keep the trend going.

Outgoing President Lee Myeong-bak,
congratulating the newly elected Park Geun-hye after the 2012 election.
(source)

During her presidential campaign, one of Park's signature themes was public safety. After Park took office, one of her first notable moves was to change the name of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security to the Ministry of Security and Public Administration--so as to convey the message that public safety takes priority in the Ministry's mission.

After the jump, how these three actors before, during and after the sinking of the Sewol.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.


BEFORE THE ACCIDENT

The Government

Cheonghaejin's purchase of the Sewol was made possible by Lee Myeong-bak administration's deregulation drive. In 2008, under the Lee administration, the maximum allowable age for a passenger ship went from 20 years to 30 years. This allowed Cheonghaejin to purchase an 18-year-old Japanese ferry ship that was going out of commission, for nearly scrap-metal price.

The advanced age of the ship caused constant problems. Company records show that the Sewol had engine RPM issues two months prior to the accident. A report from the beginning of April shows that the Sewol's helm would lose power.

The Company

Once Cheonghaejin purchased the Sewol, it added two more floors on top of the ship in order to hold more passengers and cargo. The ship, originally three stories, was modified to five stories. To build on top, Cheonghaejin removed a drawbridge ramp, which weighed 50 metric tons, from one side of the ship. In short, the modifications made the Sewol a much more unstable ship:  its center of gravity became higher, and a massive piece of metal (the ramp) was removed from only one side of the ship. A former Engineer of the Sewol said the ship would frequently list, sometimes as much as by 10 degrees. One Cheonghaejin employee quit the company before he was concerned of the Sewol's instability.

Cheonghaejin, a small, financially struggling company, also cut corners on safety. Because it never had enough money to invest in a new ship, it had consistently set itself up for the safety hazards that come with older ships. (In 2001, for example, Cheonghaejin lost two ferry ships due to fire.) Even though the Sewol was more of a (thinly) disguised cargo ship rather than a passenger ferry, the ship never had a proper harnessing system for containers. Unlike a regular container ship, there was no locking mechanism on Sewol's deck that held the containers to the floor, nor were there winches that would mechanically tighten the steel cable over the top of the containers. The contains simply rested on the deck, nominally held down by ropes that were tied to the hooks in the ship. Further, Cheonghaejin outsourced the harnessing of the cargo to a subcontractor. The subcontractor, afraid of losing Cheonghaejin's account, never could ask the ferry company to invest money in proper harnessing mechanism.

In 2013, the company only spent around $500 on the crew's safety education. As discussed further below, the company also hired inexperienced crew as a way to save money.

The Crew

As a group, the crew members had terrible job security. Korea's labor law is closer to Europe than the United States, in that employees are legally guaranteed certain rights and benefits, such as the right to unionize, receive pension and take annual leaves. However, the deregulation trend in Korea for the last decade eroded those guarantees. Currently, the labor market in Korea is divided into two groups:  "regular workers" [정규직], who receive the traditional benefits provided by Korea's labor laws, and "irregular workers" [비정규직], who do not. Unlike with the regular workers, the employer may fire the irregular workers without cause and without paying severance. As a result, compared to regular workers, irregular workers have little to no leverage with the company.

As of late 2013, approximately 2/3 of all wage workers in Korea were regular workers, 1/3 irregular workers. With the crew of Sewol, the reverse was true:  nine out of the 15 crew members were irregular workers, including the Captain. Nine out of the 15 crew members had worked for the Cheonghaejin for less than six months. (The Captain had worked for the company for more than a decade, but was recently converted into an irregular worker, presumably because of his age.) One of the First Mates joined the company the day before he boarded the Sewol. Among the top three decision-makers of the ship--i.e. the Captain and the two First Mates--only one of the First Mates was a regular worker.

The crew members were also paid poorly. Employees for domestic ferries receive less than two-thirds of the same for the ships that travel internationally. In addition, irregular workers generally get paid less than regular workers. This means that the Sewol's crew tended to be either too old or too inexperienced. The Captain was 67 years old; the Third Mate, who was steering the ship when the ship began listing, was 25 years old. Both the Third Mate and the Helmsman who were at the helm when the ship began listing had never worked on a passenger ferry until they joined the crew of the Sewol, less than six months prior.

Particularly problematic was the Captain Lee Jun-seok. Lee, in addition to being an irregular worker, was a substitute who was called in when the original captain--who is a regular worker--was taking his labor law-mandated monthly leave. Further, contrary to the normal practice of having two alternating captains for each ship, Lee served as the substitute captain for both the Sewol and the Omahana, the two ferry boats from Incheon to Jeju.

THE SEWOL SETS SAIL

Map of South Korea.
Incheon is to the west of Seoul. Jeju is the large island in the south.
The Sewol was passing the southwestern tip of Korean Peninsula.
(source)

The Company

Korean Register of Shipping, a non-profit organization, certified the safety of the Sewol after modification with several conditions. Because the ship became significantly heavier, KRS ordered the Sewol to reduce the maximum cargo load from 2,437 tons to 987 tons. Further, the Sewol had to increase the amount of ballast water it carried in the stabilizing tanks from 1,023 tons to 2,030 tons.

However, Cheonghaejin habitually overloaded the Sewol with cargo, as the cargo business from Incheon to Jeju was the true moneymaker for the company. The Sewol's regular captain, as well as the substitute Captain Lee, routinely complained that the company was overloading the ship. On the day the Sewol embarked its fateful journey, the ship's First Mate told the company that unless it stopped loading, the ship would sink. The Sewol's bill of lading shows that the ship carried jaw-dropping 3,608 tons, 3.7 times the allowed cargo weight. In order to balance the ship, the company almost certain drained a huge amount of ballast water. The net effect was to make the ship extremely unstable due to excess weight, with not enough ballast water to balance the ship.

The Government

How did the Incheon Coast Guard, which was in charge of overseeing the port of Incheon, fail to catch this unconscionable overloading? Part of it was that the Sewol's paperwork indicated that it was allowed to carry the total weight (as opposed to the cargo weight) of 3,963 tons. The paperwork should have been approved by the Coast Guard, Incheon Port Authority, the KRS, Korea Ship Safety Technology Authority and Korea Shipping Association. All of the foregoing are under investigation, as the incorrect paperwork strongly suggests potential corruption.

In fact, the Sewol was not even supposed to leave Incheon. The night before the accident, the port of Incheon was surrounded in thick fog. The Sewol, which was supposed to leave at 6:30 p.m., left the port at 9 p.m. However, at 9 p.m., the visibility was too low for the Sewol to be allowed to leave. On the night of April 15, 2014, the Sewol was the only ship that was allowed to set sail out of Incheon.

The Company

Cheonghaejin's preferred course from Incheon to Jeju included a passage through the Maenggol Road [맹골수도], near the southwestern tip of Korean Peninsula. Maenggol Road is named after the nearby Maenggol-do island, which means "the island of fierce bones" in reference to the numerous sharp rocks around the island.

The waters of the peninsula's southwest is treacherous. The body of water there is alternately known as Dadohae [다도해], "the Sea of Many Islands." The largest among them is the Jindo island, home of the famously smart and loyal Jindo dogs. The numerous small islands form a huge number of channels, which funnel the water into a surprisingly fast and choppy ride. More than 400 years ago, the legendary Admiral Yi Sun-sin [이순신] used the unpredictable current around the southwestern sea to achieve one of the greatest naval victories in recorded history, which is now known as the Battle of Myeongryang [명량해전]. With only 13 warships at his disposal, Yi lured the oncoming Japanese fleet of 133 ships into the narrows between Jindo and the mainland, called Uldolmok [울돌목]. At the Uldolmok narrows, the Japanese fleet was caught in the current that suddenly reversed direction, exactly as Admiral Yi designed. The Japanese fleet, unable to maneuver against the current, became sitting ducks for Korean fleet's focused cannon fire. The Japanese fleet withdrew after losing more than 30 ships.

The Sewol's path was in that vicinity. The Maenggol Road, located on the opposite end of Jindo from the Uldolmok narrows, has the second-fastest current speed in Korea after the Uldolmok, at approximately 6 knots (7 miles per hour.) The tide in the Maenggol Road was so fast that Korean government was planning to build a tidal power plant nearby. Naturally, it is an accident-prone course: 28 maritime accidents occurred in Maenggol Road since 2007, which was enough for Korean Marine Safety Tribunal to advise ferries to avoid taking it.

On the plus side for the company, however, taking the Maenggol Road instead of going around it saved seven nautical miles of distance. So the Sewol would sail through the fast current.

The Crew

The Sewol was speeding, likely because the ship embarked 2.5 hours after it left Incheon and wanted to make up the time. As the ship was entering the Maenggol Road, the Sewol was traveling at 19 knots, or approximately 22 miles per hour. The off-duty helmsmen of the Sewol said, normally, the ship would travel through the Maenggol Road at between 16 to 18 knots. A speeding ship tends to turn faster than a slower ship.

At the time, the ship was being steered by the 25-year-old Third Mate Park Han-gyeol [박한결] and a 55-year-old Helmsman Jo Jun-ki [조준기]. They were not supposed to. The crew's shifts were set up such that when the Sewol passed through the Maenggol Road, it would be controlled by the First Mate, who would be relieved by the Third Mate once the ship reaches the open sea between Korean Peninsula and Jeju island. But the ship departed more than two hours after the scheduled time, which meant that the First Mate's shift was over before the ship reached the Maenggol Road.

So the Third Mate was in charge. Put together, the Third Mate and the Helmsman had worked for Cheonghaejin for only nine months. Before working on the Sewol, neither the Third Mate nor the Helmsman worked on a passenger ferry. Before this time, the Third Mate had been in control of the ship through the Maenggol Road exactly once, going from Jeju to Incheon.

Korea's Sailor Act provides that the captain must steer the ship himself when the ship is passing through dangerous areas, such as a narrows. But the Captain of Sewol was in his cabin. The Captain stopped by the bridge 10 minutes before the accident to give several instructions, and returned to his cabin. It is unclear what he was doing in the cabin. Depending on where you look, the accusations run from ludicrous to salacious.

The Sewol's course in the Maenggol Road.
The island on the northeastern corner of the small map is the Jindo island.
(source)

It is unclear why the Sewol made that fateful turn. The Third Mate and the Helmsmen gave conflicting statements to the police. The Third Mate and the Helmsman may have made a mistake, or the ship's rudder may have malfunctioned. We do know, however, that the Sewol turned sharply. The ship, modified to have a higher center of gravity and weight imbalance on each side, carrying more than three times the recommended weight in cargo which was not properly secured, with much of the stabilizing water drained out of its ballast tanks, started to list beyond the crew's control.

The Sewol turned sharply, lost its balance, and began sinking at 8:48 a.m., on the morning of April 16, 2014. The nearest Coast Guard station, in Mokpo, was nearly 30 miles away.

THE SEWOL SINKS FOR 40 MINUTES

The Crew, the Company and the Government

As discussed further below, all relevant parties--the crew, Cheonghaejin, the Coast Guard, the Vessel Traffic Service--were aware that the ship was sinking by 9:07 a.m., less than 20 minutes after the accident. For the Sewol's passengers to escape from the ship, they had to be outside by around 9:50 a.m. Had any one of the actors made the correct judgment to evacuate ship during those 40 minutes or so, virtually all passenger could have been saved. Instead, all parties engaged in varying degrees of incompetence, indecision and confusion, which cost more than three hundred lives.

The Crew

At 8:55 a.m., seven minutes after the crew lost control of the ship, the crew sent a distress call to the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) at Jeju. The Crew's distress call was three minutes later than the 119 call from a Danwon High School student. To its credit, the Coast Guard station in Mokpo almost immediately dispatched a rescue team in response to the 119 call.

It is unclear why the crew sent the distress call to the VTS station at Jeju (which was still more than more than 50 miles away) as opposed to the nearest VTS station at Jindo. One former crew member of the Sewol suggested that the Crew probably called Jeju VTS instead of Jindo VTS to avoid attracting too much attention by the authorities.

The Government

The Crew's decision to call the Jeju VTS instead of the Jindo VTS caused critical inefficiency, although the inefficiency was not merely the Crew's fault. By regulation, Jindo VTS was required to monitor the movement of all vessels passing through its jurisdiction. But Jindo VTS did not establish communication until 9:07 a.m., nearly 20 minutes after the Crew lost control of the ship. It took 12 minutes for the Jeju VTS and the Mokpo Coast Guard to relay the distress call to the Jindo VTS station.

Even if the Jindo VTS station received the news earlier, it is unclear if much more could have been done in terms of rescue. The nearest Coast Guard station was in Mokpo, more than 30 miles away from the Maenggol Road and the Sewol. In short, despite the accident-prone nature of the Maenggol Road, the Coast Guard was poorly positioned to help.

The Coast Guard also did not have enough personnel to deal with a major disaster like this one. Although Mokpo Coast Guard did send the rescue team at its disposal at quickly as it could after receiving the 119 call, the team was made up of only two helicopters and two boats. The next wave of rescue team, from Korean Navy, did not arrive until 10:21 a.m., well after the 9:50 a.m. "deadline." A boat with rescue divers did not arrive until 11:24 a.m., because the divers did not assemble until 9:30 a.m. By then, Mokpo Coast Guard did not have the ship or the helicopter to send the divers directly from Mokpo to the Sewol. Some of the divers hitched a ride with the police helicopters, which were located farther inland. Some of the divers had to drive from Mokpo to Jindo, then take the boat from Jindo.

The Company

At 9:01 a.m., one of the junior crew members of the Sewol--a cabin manager for the passengers--called the Cheonghaejin Marine Co., presumably to report the accident. Afterward, the company telephoned the Captain once, and the First Mate five times. The last phone call between the Crew and the company was at 9:37 a.m. By then, the rescue team had arrived.

The contents of those telephone calls are under heavy scrutiny by the police; as of now, they are not yet known. However, the fact that Cheonghaejin called the First Mate (who was, recall, a regular worker) far more frequently than the Captain (an irregular worker) suggests that the actual decision-making authority did not correspond with the formal order. It appears that the Captain was the leader in name only; the First Mate was calling the shots. The First Mate was the one that communicated with the Jindo VTS, and he was the first to escape the Sewol when the rescue team arrived. According to the video of the rescue, the Captain did not exit the ship until the First Mate waved him out of the bridge.

The Crew

In the 40 minutes between 8:55 a.m. (the distress call) and 9:37 a.m. (last call between the First Mate and the company,) the Crew does nothing to save the passengers. Nothing. Fucking nothing. The Crew did not even answer the call from the junior crew members from below the deck, who could only tell the passengers haplessly to remain in their cabins.

When the Jindo VTS told the Crew to make the announcement to the passengers to put on life jackets, the Crew lied and said the PA system was out. When the Jindo VTS told the Captain at 9:25 a.m. to "put out life boats, use your judgment and make the decision to evacuate ship," the Crew replied with a non-sequitur:  "if we evacuate now, will there be a rescue right away?"

The Government

Once Jindo VTS began communicating with the Sewol, it acted reasonably well. It did order the Captain to deploy the life boats and evacuate the ship based on his judgment. Given that the VTS had no visual of the exact situation, it seems like an unfair, 20/20 hindsight claim to say that the VTS should have been more forceful in ordering the Captain to evacuate.

However, Jindo VTS did fail to do one thing it reasonably could have done:  take an accurate stock of the situation, and relay the information to the rescue team that was heading to the Sewol. To be fair, the VTS asked the Sewol how much water it was taking on, and whether the passengers could escape. But it could have asked more pointed questions:  where were the passengers? Did they jump into the water? Huddled at the deck? Still inside the ship?

THE PARTIAL RESCUE

The Sewol sinks, with most of its passengers trapped inside.
(source)
The Crew

At 9:35 a.m., the Coast Guard rescued the first group of people from the Sewol. As it is now infamously known, the Crew escaped first, before everyone else on the ship. Critically, the Crew never announced to the passengers that they must evacuate the ship. The junior crew, below the top deck, was left to fend for their own. They heroically saved many passengers before they themselves perished.

Initially, the Captain claimed during the investigation that he did order to evacuate before he escaped. Text messages from the passengers, sent after the Captain's escape, showed that it was a lie. Afterward, the Captain said he was concerned that the passengers would not survive if they exited the ship because the water was too cold and too fast and there was no rescue ship around. If you are wondering if that explanation makes sense, don't.

The Company

At 9:38 a.m. an employee of the Cheonghaejin Marine Co. placed a call to its field office at the port of Incheon. The employee, who is now under investigation, called to tell the field office to destroy evidence of the fact that the Sewol was vastly overloaded with cargo.

The Government

The Coast Guard first responders deserve high praise for arriving as quickly as they did. The first responders, however, had no idea about the specifics of the situation because no one asked. The first responders said when they arrived at the ship, they were perplexed that there were not a ton of people in the water already. But the urgency of the situation made the Coast Guard focus first on taking the people who were ready to get out. (And of course, the people who were most ready to board the Coast Guard rescue boat was the Crew.)

For the passengers--mostly young students--who were not lucky enough to run into the junior crew frantically running to save as many people as they could, the last official instruction they heard was to stay in their cabins. The Coast Guard's helicopter did blare through the bullhorn, telling the passengers to evacuate, but the sound did not travel far enough inside the cabins. (Also, many of the passengers were simply not in a position to escape, as the part of the ship in which they were located had already listed too much.) Had the Coast Guard known that hundreds of passengers were still inside the ship, or that the Crew never told the passengers to evacuate, they may have made a different decision and ventured into the inside of the ship, saving more people. Although it would have been very dangerous for the Coast Guard to approach the main cabin door, it was not impossible.

Ultimately, it came down to the fact that the rescue team simply did not have enough time. The Coast Guard began the rescue at 9:35 a.m. Slightly more than 20 minutes later at 9:56 a.m., the Sewol had listed 90 degrees on the left side, trapping everyone on the left. At 10:06 a.m., the Coast Guard saw passengers screaming inside a ship's cabin. The Coast Guard broke the window, and rescued seven passengers from inside the cabin. Those seven were the only ones rescued from inside the ship. The Coast Guard had no divers, and not enough people to keep breaking glass.

The last text message from inside the ship, sent by a Danwon High School student, was transmitted at 10:17 a.m. At 10:31 a.m. the Sewol capsized completely, taking everyone inside with it.

*              *              *

Part III will discuss how various political and social actors of Korea, including the disaster managers, the President, politicians, the media, and ordinary citizens reacted after the sinking of the Sewol.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Selasa, 29 April 2014

The Sewol Tragedy: Part I - The Accident

[Series Index]

(source)
To be completely honest, I really did not want to write this post. I do not want to re-live this awful tragedy, seeing again what I saw, hearing again what I heard. Writing this post was greatly upsetting. Many times, I had to stop, take a deep breath, scream in anger, or clench my teeth before I could continue writing.

But I cannot possibly write another post about Korea without addressing this terrible accident. More than 300 lives, most of them young students, perished in an entirely preventable accident. This story needs to be told, and not in the manner of the disgusting disaster porno put on by cable television news.

So here it is: a summary of the most relevant information regarding the sinking of Sewol. This summary will be in three parts:  (1) description of the accident and the rescue efforts; (2) causes and contributing factors of the accident, and; (3) political and social reactions from Korea.

THE ACCIDENT

Who and what were involved in the accident?

The Sewol was a cruise/ferry ship that traveled between Incheon, a port city near Seoul, and Jeju-do, a tropical resort island. The ship was carrying 476 passengers, as well as several trucks and container cargoes. Vast majority of the passengers--325 to be exact--were second grade students from Danwon High School, a high school in Ansan, a suburb of Seoul. 

Inside of the Sewol. Photo was taken the day before the accident.
(source)
Because Korean high schools have three grades, the second grade students are equivalent of juniors in American high schools, i.e. between 16 and 17 years old. Korean high schools usually go on one long school trip per year involving all students in the same grade. As Ansan is a working class neighborhood, the students tended to be from blue collar families. 

How did the ship begin to sink?

The travel by ferry between Incheon and Jeju is approximately 13.5 hours. The ship had traveled overnight, and entered the western shore of Jindo island, nearly at the southwestern tip of Korean Peninsula.

At 8:49 a.m. of April 16, 2014, the ship made a sharp turn, turning more than 10 degrees within one second, according to the ship's Blackbox. Immediately, the ship began to list due to the sharp turn. There are reasons to believe that the ship had an imbalanced construction, and the cargo was not properly secured. It appears likely that the cargo shifted to one side, causing the ship to list and sink. More on this in the next part of the summary.

When did the authorities first learn the accident?

At 8:52 a.m., the first report of emergency came out of the Sewol--not from the ship's crew, but from a student on board calling 119 (equivalent to 911 in the U.S.) In a couple of minutes, the student was connected to the Coast Guard. (The student, named Choi Deok-ha [최덕하], was found dead.) In response, at 8:58 a.m., the Coast Guard station in the nearby port city of Mokpo dispatched the first rescue team.

At 8:55 a.m., the Sewol's captain Lee Jun-seok [이준석] communicated to the Vessel Transportation Service (VTS) station in Jeju that the ship was listing and sinking. (Note, however, that the nearest VTS station was at Jindo, not Jeju. More on this later.) At 9:10 a.m., the Coast Guard headquarters formed a rescue central. At 9:31 a.m., President Park Geun-hye was notified.

How did the ship's crew respond to the accident? How did the passengers respond?

The ship's crew, particularly the captain, responded with grievous, deadly incompetence. It is probably fair to say that the incompetence by the captain and the senior crew members bears the majority of the blame in letting this incident escalate from an expensive accident to a horrific, full-scale disaster.

As soon as the Jindo VTS station established contact with the Sewol, the VTS repeatedly asked the captain whether the passengers were able to escape. In a reply that is almost certainly a lie, the captain replied they could not. At 9:25 a.m., approximately 30 minutes after the ship began to sink, Jindo VTS station ordered the captain in unequivocal terms: have the passengers put on life jackets, and evacuate the ship. Inexplicably, the captain did nothing, telling the Jindo VTS that the ship's PA system did not work. This was a lie, as the PA system was completely functional at the time. Jindo VTS again told the captain to do what he could to evacuate the ship. The captain, again, does nothing. At 9:33 a.m., Jindo VTS station orders the captain to release all emergency floats from the ship. The captain, again, does nothing other than to keep telling the VTS station to send rescue boats as quickly as possible.

Meanwhile, manning the PA system in the lower deck were junior crew members, who continuously asked the bridge if they should evacuate the ship. The bridge, where the captain was, did not respond. Without information, the crew followed the manual and repeatedly told the passengers to stay in their rooms.

Park Ji-yeong, one of the Sewol's heroes
(source)
When the first responders arrived at 9:30 a.m., 22-year-old Park Ji-yeong [박지영], 28-year-old Jeong Hyeon-seon [정현선] and 45-year old Yang Dae-hong [양대홍], all of whom are crew members, directed all passengers they saw to get out of the ship. Realizing that there was no PA announcement, Park rushed to the PA system and ordered the passengers to jump into the water--at 10:15 a.m. Unfortunately, this was far too late, as the port side (left side) of the ship was already fully under water by 9:54 a.m. Once submerged, the passengers in the port side cabins were doomed.

Park and Jeong were later found dead; Yang is still missing. Surviving students recall that Park saved many students by putting on life jackets on them and pushing them upstairs. When the students asked if Park wasn't leaving, she replied: "The crew has to stay until the end." Before returning to rescue, Yang telephoned his wife and said:  "the ship listed a lot. Use the money in the bank account for the children's tuition. I have to go save the students."

According to survivors, many students gave their lives trying to save each other, or to save little children. A six year old boy put a life jacket on his five year old sister, and told her that he was going to find his parents. The five-year-old was rescued; the boy, and his parents, are missing. Danwon high school student Jeong Cha-ung [정차웅], a blackbelt holder in kendo and the first confirmed casualty from the Sewol, perished after giving up his life jacket to a friend and trying to save more. According to surviving students, two of Danwon high school teachers, 36-year-old Nam Yoon-cheol and 24-year-old Choi Hye-jeong, each saved at least 10 students before succumbing to the rising water.

(More after the jump)

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.


Wait, go back. What the hell was the captain and the senior crew doing during all that time? Why were they lying to the Vessel Traffic Service?

For now, we cannot be certain. One tidbit, however, is revealing: between 9 a.m. and 9:37 a.m., the captain and the crew spoke on the phone with the ferry company's headquarters six times. Police investigation is heavily focused on what was said in these communications.

How effective was the first response?

The first responders, consisting of two boats and two helicopters, did their best given the circumstances. The first rescue team, dispatched by the Mokpo Coast Guard station, arrived at the scene by 9:30 a.m. and began taking people off the ship by 9:35 a.m. Jindo VTS also ordered the nearby ships to join the rescue effort at 9:30 a.m.

Then the now-infamous moment occurred: Lee Jun-seok, the captain, was one of the first to escape. Critically, the captain left the ship without announcing to the passengers and other crew members to abandon ship or deploying the life boats. In a case of stomach-turning injustice, the captain and the crew arrived at the port of Jindo by 10:30 a.m., only moments after the ship sank.

Video of the crew escaping before the passengers

Though the first rescue team arrived as quickly as it could, it was already too late. The first responders did not have adequate equipment to rescue the passengers who were trapped inside the ship. Korean Navy responded, but its ship did not arrive until 10:21 a.m.--when the Sewol was mostly underwater. A ship with rescue divers did not arrive until 11:24 a.m., four minutes after the ship sank completely.

At 10:06 a.m., the Coast Guard saw passengers screaming inside a ship's cabin. The Coast Guard broke the window, and rescued seven passengers from inside the cabin. Those seven were the only ones rescued from inside the ship. Many of the passengers who were trapped inside the ship were not able to escape, even as they were watching the rescue boats outside. The students of Danwon high school took the worst end of it, as most of them were in the lower decks of the ship where the fare was cheaper.

How many survived?

In the end, 174 out of the 476 survived. Out of the 325 students of Danwon high school, only 75 survived. Although there was faint hope that rescue divers may be able to save at least a few trapped inside the ship, the survivor count did not go up after the first day of the accident.

Part II will discuss the causes and contributing factors for the accident. If you have a burning question regarding this tragedy, please email and I will consider adding to this post, or addressing in the later parts.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Rabu, 16 April 2014

#NotYourMascot, and Why You Should Care

Normally, I make it my practice to silently observe the discussion involving other social groups of America. The reason for this is simple: it is important for each social group to speak with its own voice. Even if I wanted to help, it is the better habit to refrain. I have seen too many cases in which good intentions were translated into stumbling, inartful words, setting back the agenda rather than advancing it. That was not going to be me.

Despite those reservations, I feel compelled to speak out in solidarity for the movement against having a racial slur, i.e. "Redskins," as the name of an NFL franchise. I feel the compulsion for two reasons. First, I am a sports fan and a resident of the Washington D.C. area, which makes the name of the local franchise more relevant than those living outside of the region who don't care about sports. Second, I am an Asian American, and I have been mired in the ill-advised hashtag campaign from a few weeks ago that distracted the national attention away from this important issue. Though I have been speaking out on the stupidity of the hashtag campaign, it is undeniable that I, too, contributed to the distraction.

How shall I express my solidarity with the campaign against "Redskins," without running afoul of my personal rule that I should not speak on behalf of others? Answer: I can speak about my own experience, which points toward the same result. Here is my attempt at doing so.

*               *               *

I am a first generation immigrant, having emigrated from Korea to Los Angeles area in 1997. I will not bore you with the sob stories about my adjustment into American life at age 16, since I have already done that in this space already. It would enough to say that, the first year of my American life was defined largely by loneliness. In Seoul, I lived in the same neighborhood throughout my childhood. I had a close group of friends who attended the same elementary school, same middle school and same high school. The move to U.S. was the first major move I remember--and it had to be across the Pacific, in a new land where no one wanted to talk to the new kid who spoke broken English.

(More after the jump)

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.



But it did not take long for me to realize that, in America, there is a shortcut to forming a closer relationship with a total stranger. In Los Angeles, the shortcut came in the names of Dodgers and Lakers. I have always been a sports fan, watching baseball and basketball in Korea before I moved. The Lakers, in particular, had just drafted an exciting young rookie named Kobe Bryant. I watched the emergence of a legend with rapt attention.

(source)

"Lakers." "Kobe." I soon found out those were magic words. Hearing those words was an open invitation to everyone within the earshot to jump into the conversation. It is perhaps one of the few instances of American social etiquette in which it is rarely rude to jump into the conversation between total strangers. Say the magic words, and a conversation developed instantly, if only because some stranger was guaranteed to jump into the conversation. It did not matter that I was an awkward FOB with broken English. The congregation for the church of basketball can happen anywhere, and all those who followed the sport were equal participants.

The idea that pro sports in America promote social cohesion is hardly new. Less appreciated, however, is just how special pro sports can be to new immigrants and racial minorities. Jay Caspian Kang put it perfectly:
[M]y own stake in baseball comes from the fact that I am the foreign-born child of Korean immigrants, and that sometimes finding acceptance in this country is as simple as shouting out in a crowded bar that you know who started each game of the 1986 World Series because you, like the rest of the people there, watched every game on TV and talked about it the next day at school.

The word "acceptance" is the key. For all the claims of color-blindedness, there is an instinctive filter between people of different color and culture that makes the person in front of them not an individual, but a scale model of the various stereotypes we hold. Much like Christianity claims to work more for the meek and the downtrodden, the magic of professional sports--America's civic religion--works more for immigrants and racial minorities. Talk about the 1986 World Series, Derek Fisher's miraculous 0.4 second shot, or 17-1 Patriots and the Helmet Catch, and the filter disappears as if by miracle. Invoke the incantations, and one can instantly regain one's humanity in the eyes of others. 

Which brings us to the Washington Redskins.

Here is something that one can only learn through experience: a group eventually comes to take on the character of the core around which the group has coalesced. The name of your sports teams matters, because the value embedded in the names will seep into the fandom. This truth can only be learned through experience because it is purely inductive. There may not be a logical compulsion leading to this conclusion, but the entire human experience is behind it.

Los Angeles sports fans are notorious for being nonchalant about their teams. This is neither correct nor fair; visit the playoff games for the Dodgers or the Lakers, and the error of that notion will be made self-evident. But the notion does have a grain of truth, in this sense: Los Angeles sports fans realize that, ultimately, sports are not THAT important. Angelenos are not like Midwesterners, whose collective mood swings wildly depending on the performance of the Green Bay Packers or the Chicago Bears that week. And one cannot help but realize that the absurd names of the LA sports teams--Lakers, Dodgers--contributes to the mindset peculiar to the LA sports fans. There is no lake in Los Angeles to speak of, and there is no trolley to dodge in the streets. Saying those names as one talks about pro sports makes one realize that, at the end of the day, pro sports in America is a giant inside joke and we are all just playing along. This allows LA fans to become a bit more detached from their sports teams, allowing them to ration their emotion until they liberally spend it in the important moments that count.

Names matter, because the values behind them reach out and touch us. Another Washington sports team had already recognized this and changed its name. Washington Bullets, one of the oldest NBA franchises, changed its 34-year-old name to Washington Wizards in 1997, as the team owner Abe Pollan felt that it was inappropriate to have a team called "the bullets" in what was then-murder capital of America. I wonder why Dan Snyder could not learn from Pollan's example.

There should be no serious debate that the name "Redskins" is noxious. It makes a racial slur appear normal. It reduces living, breathing humans into a permanent stereotype, which is then printed on uniforms, caps, t-shirts and flags that become ubiquitous in our living spaces. That Redskins is by far the most popular sports team in the Washington D.C. area should be worrisome. That Asian Americans of this area (recall that D.C.-Maryland-Virginia metro area has the nation's third largest Korean American concentration) would use "Redskins" as the magic word to gain acceptance in the mainstream society should be even more worrisome. 

In the end, we become the air we breathe. Use poison as a building block of our identity, and we ourselves become poisonous. Pro sports matters more to Asian Americans. This is why we should care about this issue.

Got a question or comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Senin, 14 April 2014

How to Make it in America with Music

Dear Korean,

I'd love to hear your opinion on what it would take for a Korean or Korean-American act to "make it" in the US music industry. You could answer that from a macro (shifts in music business corporate strategies, national news outlet coverage) or micro (would the act have to have certain characteristics, would the songs have to be in a certain genre) perspective. I think it is without question there is original, vibrant talent originating or having origins from South Korea. Talent that if all other things were equal, would easily go toe-to-toe with American pop talent and be equally represented. 

Jason J.

This is a question that the Korean intended to answer as a final wrap-up for SXSW, until the #CancelColbert hashtag war occupied the attention of everyone on the Internet. Better late than never, so here it is. By the way, did the Korean mention that SXSW was freakin' awesome, and everyone should go? Just in case people missed it: SXSW is incredible, and everyone should go. It's absolutely amazing.

Jambinai's performance at Spider House.
TK's favorite picture from SXSW.
Truth is, TK answered this question in previous posts, albeit somewhat obliquely. (Here and here.) To make the point more directly, the Korean believes that the "mainstream-ization" of Korean pop music in the United States will take place in several stages:

First, there needs to be a dedicated group of Korean pop music fanatics, who would serve as the log-rollers of a larger trend. Every band needs that snotty group of fans that says: "I was into them before they became big." The Korean jests, but the role of the enthusiastic early adopters is critical. They act as the constantly-burning pilot light, ready to ignite the trend as soon as the atmosphere is correct. 

It took a better part of a decade for K-pop to build this infrastructure in the United States. But from his experience at SXSW, the Korean is convinced that this infrastructure is now firmly in place. K-Pop Night Out was one of the most successful showcases at SXSW, and the people came out not just for Jay Park and HyunA, but for Crying Nut and Idiotape. Seoulsonic showcase had so many non-Koreans speaking fluent Korean, chatting excitedly about Glen Check. The only other place where I saw that many non-Koreans speaking fluent Korean was at a high-brow diplomatic function Washington D.C. Even in San Antonio, a smaller city that one would not readily associate with Korean pop music fandom, drew a solid crowd for a Sunday night show. Separately from SXSW, Dynamic Duo's recent showcase at the Kennedy Center drew at least 500 spectators, half of whom were not Korean but screaming as loudly as any other. The early adopters are already here.

Second, there needs to be a baseline of respect for Korean pop music among the movers and shakers of America's music industry. This, in fact, was a crucial component for Gangnam Style's success. Many consider Gangnam Style to have come out of nowhere, like a strike of lightning out of a clear blue sky. Not so. This graph is worth revisiting:


This graph, from a study that YG Entertainment commissioned, shows the interplay between the log rollers and the power brokers of American pop music. Numerous log rollers, chief among them Allkpop, promoted Gangnam Style's music video through its Twitter. Rapper T-Pain had enough baseline respect for Korean pop music to pay attention when enough log rollers became excited about Gangnam Style. T-Pain took the time to look at PSY's music video, and promoted to other industry insiders. The rest, as they say, is history.

In the Korean's estimation, this stage is partially constructed for Korean pop music. Korea's idol groups are the farthest along. Lady Gaga's recent pick of Crayon Pop to open her shows this summer is but one piece of evidence. Among the powers that be of American pop music, Korean idol groups are taken seriously. 

Korean rock and hip hop acts are trailing behind. Korean rock suffers from fighting in a crowded field; as delightful as listening to, say, Deli Spice is, there is simply no shortage of U2-inspired modern rock bands in the U.S. market. Even so, certain Korean rock bands manage to find an angle that is not sufficiently explored in the U.S. rock scene--for example, Jambinai with Korean traditional instruments or Glen Check's sophisticated synth-rock. Hip hop will probably have the toughest time, as the audience for hip hop tends to care a great deal about (perceived) authenticity. Unfortunately, to many U.S. hip hop fans, an Asian face does not scream "THUG LIFE." 

Third, the interplay between the first and the second stages results in a sizable corps of fan base. This group would be much, much larger than the log rollers in the first stage. Their interest in Korean pop music would not be as rabid as the log rollers', but they care enough to continuously purchase albums and attend concerts once in a while, to the extent Korean acts tour in the United States. Ideally, this group will be large enough for Korean bands to continue directing at least some effort toward the U.S., in the form of making their music available in the U.S. (via, for example, YouTube and iTunes) and putting on regular tours. Likewise ideally, this group will be large enough that, when an American person says "I listen to Korean pop music," it would be received as if she said "I like listening to classical music" rather than "I listen to radio static to find signs of life from outer space."

If Korean pop music gets to this point, the Korean would consider Korean pop music to have "made it" in the U.S. market. One has to be reasonable: Korean pop music is not of the U.S., and it is highly unlikely that Korean pop music will be a perennial presence in Billboard top 5. Much more attainable is the level at which the quality of Korean pop music is widely known, such that it is accepted as a legitimate preference of pop music among many. Korea's idol pop is at the cusp of getting to this place; other genres of K-pop have a longer way to go.

Then there is the fourth and final stage:  a viral, mainstream-ized hit a la Gangnam Style, seemingly appearing out of nowhere as if by magic. But of course, nothing cultural comes out of nowhere--each viral hit is a sudden unleashing of pent-up cultural accumulation. As the base of K-pop appreciation becomes wider and deeper, the interval between new viral hits will become shorter and shorter.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Kamis, 03 April 2014

Against Hashtag Warriors: Their Arguments and Why They are Wrong

For the last week, I have had a chance to survey the landscape of opinions regarding the #CancelColbert campaign. Here are the major arguments in favor of the hashtag war, and why they are wrong.

- The Main Argument:  "Regardless of what Stephen Colbert intended, the use of the phrase "ching chong ding dong" is reminiscent of the racism that Asian Americans face. (In other words, it is "triggering".) To remind Asian Americans of racism in such a manner is insensitive and racist."

This is the crux of the #CancelColbert supporters' argument. Note that, under this argument, context in which the phrase is said does not matter, and neither does intent. Whenever the phrase is said, it triggers. Whenever the sound of the phrase is heard, it is racist. This is "magic word racism," pure and simple: if you say the word X, no matter what the circumstance, you are being racist.

#CancelColbert was not a worthy effort in large part because it is just another rendition of the magic word racism. I made this point previously, but it bears repeating and amplifying: magic word racism causes real harm. It distracts the attention from racism's core, which resides in the heart rather than words. Magic word racism lends support to, for example, the incessant whining about why black people get to say "n-----" but not white people. (If word itself is the problem, why do some people get to say it?)

Only by being sensitive to context and intent can one avoid the pitfalls of magic word racism, but #CancelColbert demands that we look away from the context.

- The "What About Black People?" Argument:  "Stephen Colbert wouldn't use African Americans as a topic and use the n-word, would he? So why is it ok for him to use Asian Americans and 'ching chong?'"

This argument, again, displays lack of consideration toward context--in this case, a historical and social one. To state plainly, Asian Americans are not African Americans, and "ching chong" is not "n-----". Historically, we Asian Americans never experienced anything close to what African Americans experienced on account of our race. Even the darkest moments of Asian American history--Chinese Exclusion Acts, the World War II Internment, Vincent Chin--are not comparable to slavery, mass rape and lynching that African Americans historically endured. Currently, Asian Americans are not experiencing a comparable level of discrimination to which African Americans are subjected. There is no stop-and-frisk program targeting Asian Americans. There is no current Asian American equivalent of Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis.

Are African Americans accorded greater deference in the media than Asian Americans are? Yes, and rightly so, considering the historical and contemporary context. Black folks has gone through more shit, and are going through more shit, than Asian Americans have and are. To give African Americans a bit more breathing room is the right thing to do.

Critics of Colbert have argued that Stephen Colbert should not be allowed to try and support one minority group (Native Americans) by using another (Asian Americans) as a prop. But when they raise this argument, it is the critics who use the African Americans as a stepladder. 

(More after the jump.)

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- The "We are Getting Racist Attacks!" Argument:  "Suey Park received an avalanche of genuinely racist attacks, even death threats. If the Colbert Report is not racist, why do racists support it so extremely?"

This is frivolous. We are talking about the Internet, in which racism and death threats may as well be the wind and the rain. Thoughtful reactions count; crazy ones do not. That an argument attracts a lot of crazy reaction does nothing to support the initial argument.

If this is not obvious, consider this. Before Suey Park, another Asian American woman was subject to vile racism and death threats due to her outspoken position. Her name? Amy Chua. The amount of racist bile that Chua received after her Tiger Mother article was no less than Park's share. Now, ask yourself: did your opinion Amy Chua and the Tiger Mother theory change because of the racist attacks against Amy Chua? The only honest answer is "no." Same is true here.

- The "We Didn't Really Mean 'Cancel'" Argument:  "The word 'cancel' in #CancelColbert was a rallying slogan rather than a literal demand. Why do people focus on 'cancel' rather than focus on the real issue: the Colbert Report's racism against Asian Americans?"

Fundamentally, the answer is this: because there was no racism against Asian Americans in Colbert's joke. "Magic word racism" is not a valid approach, and it is not convincing to say that simply saying the word automatically equals racism.

But even one sets that aside, this is a strange argument. Suddenly, it is the #CancelColbert supporters who are calling for people to get past the semantics and focus on the intent behind the literal meaning of the words. Why can't they apply the same standard for Colbert's joke? If one can say "cancel" without actually conveying the meaning of the word "cancel," is it so inconceivable that a satirical comedian can say "ching chong" without conveying racism?

In an interview with the New Yorker, Suey Park claims that she had to go over top to make a point: “There’s no reason for me to act reasonable, because I won’t be taken seriously anyway. So I might as well perform crazy to point out exactly what’s expected from me.” 

This claim does not pass the laugh test. Suey Park is already an established writer of international fame, having recently come off of the very successful #NotYourAsianSidekick campaign. Park was already at a point where she could get herself published on a major platform at any time she wanted. (And she did, as she published a more detailed explanation of #CancelColbert campaign on the Time magazine.) If she did feel offended by Colbert's joke, Park would have had plenty of audience without having to "perform crazy." But she chose otherwise, harming others in the process. (More on this below.)

- The "But My Feelings!" Argument:  "Regardless of Stephen Colbert's intent, the phrase 'ching chong' really is triggering to a lot of Asian Americans, causing them to feel alienated from their country. Why is this so objectionable?"

It is objectionable because the #CancelColbert supporters are not simply expressing their feelings; they are calling for the cancellation of the Colbert Report.

Let me be clear: one has a right to feel anything and everything, no matter how frivolous and irrational. Such little irrationalities are important, as they may well be what makes us individuals. Who are we if not a collection of our random characteristics? Likewise, one has a right to express those feelings and discuss them among like-minded people. This is how, for example, great novelists make their names. Those feelings are valid, and so are the expression of those feelings.

However, arguments for a collective action are not like emotions unique to each individual. There is a threshold one must meet before one can persuasively demand another to cater to one's emotions. There really is a line that separates serious arguments from frivolous ones, strong arguments from untenable ones. The precise location of that line may be difficult to nail down, but there should be little dispute that disproportionately shrill reaction to a nonexistent offense falls on the wrong side of that line.

For that reason, #CancelColbert is on the wrong side of that line. It decries racism where there is none, and demands extreme measures to that fictional racism. The argument is indefensible.

- The "What's it to You?" Argument:  "Call me shrill, oversensitive, annoying, a social justice misanthrope without a sense of humor.  . . .  If I’m overreacting then why are you still bothered by it?"

Above are the words of Shawna F., who emailed me for my take. 

The #CancelColbert movement bothers me because it causes several concrete harms.

First, #CancelColbert is based on "magic word racism," which causes harm. It urges people to put a blindfold over themselves, so that they may ignore the intent behind words. Magic word racism does nothing to fight the actual racism, which resides in the intent. Instead, it encourages a version of racism that eschews those magic words while discriminating in a more subtle, insidious manner. Worse, it may be used as a cudgel to deprive self-determination from racial minorities. (E.g. "If whites cannot say the n-word, neither can blacks!")

Second, #CancelColbert distracts from the ongoing, severe issue that Stephen Colbert intended to highlight: the continuing insult to Native Americans in the form of a name of a major NFL franchise. 

Some have objected to this point by claiming that advocacy is not a zero-sum game. I beg to differ: public attention is a finite thing. If it were not, the people and entities who feed on public attention--political parties, media, writers, entertainers--would not be spending the money and effort to get themselves in front of people, trying to get their voice heard. If one topic becomes large enough, it does displace others from the minds of the public.

Do you think listening to the harmed party is important? Then listen to the Native Americans, who are rightly aggrieved that the movement against the offensive racial slur was hijacked by this stupid campaign. As an Asian American and a D.C.-area resident, I am mortified.

Third, #CancelColbert debases the legitimate battles that Asian Americans fight against media bias. There truly are worthy battles to fight in this area, and this hashtag war made a mockery of it.

Credibility is a precious thing: once you lose it, it is exceedingly difficult to regain it. Call this "respectability politics" if you want. All I know is what I have learned by being a licensed advocate my entire adult life: if you don't have credibility, you are finished. You are a Cassandra, over whose words the "mute" switch is on. The #CancelColbert supporters love to talk about how their viewpoint is "silenced." But when you destroy your own credibility, you are silencing yourself.

I am not optimistic that mainstream America would be so discerning to distinguish #CancelColbert from other, more worthwhile fight against media bias in the future conducted by Asian Americans. This hashtag war incurred a cost, and Asian American activists in the future will have to pay it down the line.

Fourth, #CancelColbert divides the Asian American community.

Let me be clear on this point: in certain contexts (hey, there's that word again,) speaking of an "Asian American community" is fallacious. Asian Americans are a hugely diverse group, within which there are a number of different ethnicity, languages, food, custom, socio-economic status, etc. Accordingly, there are many issues regarding which the Asian American community does not speak with one voice, nor should it. 

Media bias against Asian Americans is not one of those issues. Just in case the #CancelColbert folks still don't get it: no one disputes that there is bias against Asian Americans in the media. There truly are worthy battles to fight in this issue. Just to give a few examples: a troubling lack of Asian Americans in the lead role; stereotypical, two-dimensional Asian characters; cultural appropriation and debasement; whitewashing an Asian story or an Asian character. The list can go on.

Addressing this bias helps all Asian Americans, not just a select few. Media representation of Asian Americans will influence the perception of all Asian Americans, not just Asian American men or Asian Americans who are higher on the socio-economic ladder. This is an issue that ought not cause a split among Asian Americans.

Yet here we are. #CancelColbert has created a schism among Asian Americans. For example, there is now a hashtag civil war among Asian Americans, as those who disagree with Suey Park's tactics have begun a new hashtag campaign called #BuildDontBurn. As I wrote in the previous post on this topic, this is what happens when one chooses an unworthy battle to fight. A large swath of Asian Americans (by my count, the majority) simply cannot sign onto the argument that Stephen Colbert was being racist with that joke, because he was not. 

A large part of the blame for this must rest the feet of Suey Park and her coterie, and the take-no-prisoners tactic that they employ in their hashtag war. To this group, respectful dissent is a foreign concept. When a Native American activist complained that #CancelColbert was distracting from the original issue, Suey Park and her gang bullied her into silence. Any Asian American who disagreed with Park's message or tactics was branded as an Uncle Tom. Jeff Yang, journalist for the Wall Street Journal and arguably the most high-profile Asian American dissenter, was called "Asian in yellow face" and "merkin for the white man." In a height of irony, a white man who is friends with Suey Park called me a "white supremacist", apparently because I did not listen to the white man's directive that I should feel offended, even though I am not.

Juliet Shen, a co-activist for the #NotYourAsianSidekick campaign with Park, was not spared from this flame war. Her description of Suey Park's gang is enough to make one at a loss for words:
Let’s call this what it is: cyberbullying. I’m not saying it’s Suey, but I am saying that it’s her followers. There is a large group of people who have created an echo chamber that repeatedly enables and reinforces bad behavior. Harassment. Stalking. Name-calling. Character assassination. Misinformation. Emotional manipulation. Propaganda. This isn’t calling people out for racist, sexist, homophobic behavior — it’s using these terms so freely that we lose sight of the actual racists and sexists and bigots. It’s hurling the term gaslighting so often at other people and inaccurately while actually gaslighting the same people. I think that there are a lot of people who follow Suey for her politics while not knowing her tactics. I’d probably do the same if I wasn’t aware of the way she treated people. 
I guess this all leads to one question: what now? I’m still hesitant and I’m still scared. I don’t want to post anything and I don’t want to write about politics or feminism or racism. I have seriously considered going completely offline, just getting a job, moving to California, and pretending there aren’t a million things I want to say about the institutional and individual oppression we face every single day. Every time I tweet something relatively political, someone comes after me with academic rhetoric, claims of homophobia and racism, and accusations of being a sell-out. I’ve gone from confident and optimistic speaker glowing about the magic of social media in community organizing to scared and increasingly apathetic college student contemplating leaving activism behind.
Similar revelations from those who had been close to Suey Park and was burned are coming to the public as this saga drags on. With each story like this one, Park's credibility becomes lower and lower, circling around the drain. I wouldn't mourn the loss, except I know already that this will play out. It will play out in a way that damages not just Suey Park, but all Asian Americans.

To make up for the lost credibility, Park's gambits will become more and more outrageous. She herself signaled this exact game plan, in so many words: if people don't take you seriously, do crazy things. By becoming more outrageous, Park will guarantee herself a consistent level of public visibility in the media, which loves no one like it loves circus clowns. Park will join the long heritage of media clowns who generate far more heat than light, the likes of Coulter, Palin, Moore and Sharpton. Similar to those who came before her, Park will become that one example that the opponents use to discredit the entire Asian American experience.

This, to me, is the greatest harm that came from the hare-brained campaign of #CancelColbert, and this is why I am so angry at this stupidity.

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