Selasa, 29 Juni 2010

Should Korean Americans Embrace America?

Dear Korean,

Do you think Korean Americans should completely embrace this country and "become Americans"?

K. Soje



Dear K. Soje,

Yes. As Americans, there should be no question that Korean Americans must embrace America. Thanks for reading!

Alright, alright. That probably is not enough, because we need to figure out what it means to "completely embrace" America and "become Americans." K. Soje perhaps spotted this issue as well, since he put "become Americans" in quotes.

This is a difficult question, because the concept of "becoming American" is particularly elusive. The concept is elusive because for every criterion one can come up with, a plausible counter-argument can be made. Does holding the blue eagle passport make someone American, even though she longs for the destruction of America and will take steps toward her wishes? (For example like Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber?) Does being born and raised in America make someone American, even though he defects and joins the enemy military? (For example, like John Walker Lindh?) Does sincerely pledging allegiance to American flag make one an American? (That would exclude American-born and American-raised Jehovah's Witnesses.) Does paying taxes to the American government make one an American? (But many non-American millionnaires pay more taxes to the American government than any average American would, and many poor Americans pay no taxes at all.)

 John Walker Lindh. If the Korean had his way,
his American citizenship would have been revoked.

Let's try stretching this inquiry to the maximum. Does one have to be white to be an American? There was a point in time when the answer to this question was yes. During World War II, more than a hundred thousand ethnic Japanese – majority of them American citizens – were rounded up into concentration camps. When Japanese Americans took to the court to vindicate the rights that were apparently given to them as American citizens under the United States Constituion, but the Supreme Court found a way to interpret the Constitution such that Japanese Americans would remain in detention.

Frankly, the question is far too daunting for the Korean to give a clear answer. It is more likely that the answer will shift over time. During World War II, American citizenship, having been born in America and speaking accentless English was not enough for Japanese Americans to be treated like Americans. But the insane race traitor bitch Michell Malkin aside, race-based internment of American citizens will not likely happen again because the concept of "American-ness" has evolved since the 1940s to be more color-blind.

But the Korean can identify one aspect by which Korean/Asian Americans fare very well. To do that, the Korean will give a story he heard recently from a former federal prosecutor.

This prosecutor was trying to put a band of human traffickers behind bars. These traffickers would recruit people from a poor region of China with a promise to get them to America for $40,000 per person. People who sign up pay half of the required money first. Then they are taken into the hull of a fishing ship, and sail for more than a month inside the boat without seeing daylight. Upon arrival, they are secretly taken into what amounts to a cage in New York Chinatown -- often right on top of or underneath the restaurants and shops that numerous tourists frequent. There, they would be locked up until their family sends the rest of the funds.

There were plenty of other charges that would stick with the traffickers, but the traffickers seemed like they were able to beat one of the charges -- kidnapping. In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecutor had to prove that the smuggled people were detained and moved against their will. And the prosecutor was having a hell of a time trying to prove that they were held against their will because truth is, everyone knew exactly what they were getting into. With the smuggled Chinese people on the witness stand, the defense attorney for the traffickers would fire questions after questions showing that yes, they knew they would be locked up in a hull of a ship without seeing daylight for a month. Yes, they knew they would then be locked up in a den until their family paid. Yes, they paid money to these traffickers even though they knew that they were walking into a situation where they would be certainly locked up in various places for a long period of time. Without coercion, there was no kidnapping.

The prosecutor was able to prevail by convincing the judge that to prove kidnapping, he only had to show that even if the smuggled people consented to being locked up, they could not get out even if they changed their minds. The traffickers were convicted of all charges made, and justice was served. But that is not the point on which the Korean wishes to focus here, for now. Instead, consider this -- even in an intimidating courtroom setting, even after describing the ordeals of being locked up in a ship then in a tiny room for more than a month, even with the prospect of exacting revenge to the traffickers who put them through that ordeal, the Chinese witnesses were unwavering: Yes, they voluntarily paid a huge sum of money to be locked up for at least a month, and indefinitely if their family did not pay, as long as they can come to America.

In some sense, this is the story of all Asian Americans. Yes, the Korean is aware that a few important distinctions exist. Most of us probably came to America via a more comfortable route than through an empty tank in a fishing boat. More importantly, most of us are present in America legally. But these distinctions should not obscure what makes Asian Americans particularly American -- for the most part, we either made a conscious choice to become American, or are born into people who made a conscious choice to become American.

This is important because choice goes to the core of America's existence. America began with people who chose to cross the ocean to a new land, to make a new life for themselves and their children. Everything that America stands for -- freedom, equality, pursuit of happiness -- originates from the burning desire to make life better and better for oneself and one's children, as well as the fearless adventurism that drove the future Americans to cross not only the literal ocean, but also the figurative ocean of linguistic and cultural differences. (Yes, the Korean is fully aware that Native Americans and African Americans got a raw deal out of that. But eventually and on balance, what America stands for made the lives of Native Americans and African Americans better, however belatedly.)

Therein lies the genius of America. America constantly renews itself with immigrants, as each wave of new immigrants to America carries the same flame that the Founding Fathers and the first generation of Americans carried. As the newest generation of Americans, Asian Americans may be temporally farthest away from the first Americans. But because Asian Americans can vividly recall and describe their or their parents' desire to make a new life for themselves, they share the closest spiritual connection to the first Americans.

What could be more American than that?

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Sabtu, 26 Juni 2010

Good job, Taeguk Warriors -- there was nobody in the world who could do anything about Suarez's last goal. They achieved what they set out to do (which was to make it to the knockout round,) and that's good enough. Kudos for everyone.

The silver lining? The Korean does not have to think about figuring out whom to root for in a U.S.-Korea game. Who would have thought those two countries could possibly meet in a game in the knockout stage?

-EDIT- Ok Americans, that was a damn poor showing. How do you keep giving up goals in the first five minutes of EVERY period? Jesus Christ.

Jumat, 25 Juni 2010

Ask a Korean! News: Apple v. Samsung

One of the Korean's favorite blogs is Alternative Hypothesis, providing analysis on technology market with respect to Korea and other world leaders. The blog is run by Mr. Kim Sang-Hoon, a reporter covering business for Dong-A Ilbo.

Mr. Kim recently penned an extremely interesting piece comparing Apple and Samsung, as reflected by their newest smartphones. Below is a translation. (Because the Korean is unfamiliar with tech terms, the translation may not match up perfectly.)

Great Product and Great Factory - the Difference Between IPhone 4 and Galaxy S

I just came back last night from Japan. I was there for the Google Conference, but apparently the world is now full of chatter about Apple and Samsung Electronics. Many commentators in the news said that iPhone with strong software augmented the hardware, and Galaxy with strong hardware augmented the software, in the end resembling each other. I don't know about that -- really, what things are similar?

Actually, there is nothing special about iPhone 4's hardware. The A4 Chip, reported to have been improved in quality, was previously used in iPad and fundamentally is a semiconductor using ARM's core. Of course the detailed specifications are very important, but to put it very simply and just looking at the numbers, it is not much different from the 1 GHz chipset used in Snapdragon or Galaxy S by Samsung. Also, the "Retina" Display that caused a stir is no more than an IPS-style LCD with excellent resolution. Although it is much better than any other low-cost LCD, with respect to the ability to display outdoors or the view angles, (roughly speaking,) there is not much difference with HD LCD that goes into phones made by LG Electronics. Personally, I believe that LG Electronics had the ability to order a single-standard component as many as Apple could order, LG would have been the one introducing the Retina Display. (Of course, it is a separate question whether LG has enough marketing acumen to name it "retina.")

At any rate, what is important is not the specs of each and every hardware. What is important is the purpose for which this product is made, and how the new functionalities organically unite with the old functionalities to serve this purpose. Apple is really good at this. To give an example, I personally think iPhone 4's camera -- which was buried by the fanfare over other parts -- is the prime example.

In talking about iPhone 4's camera, Steve Jobs said one should focus on the purpose for which the camera is used instead of engaging in a megapixel race, because a phone camera is fundamentally a tool that one always carries around to record one's surroundings. Therefore, a phone camera ultimately has a smaller image sensor (which acts like the film) and smaller lens. Then naturally, the picture is murky and the quality of the photo taken in a dark place is even worse. Given this characteristic, a phone camera will never be better than a DSLR. Instead, Steve Jobs emphasizes that iPhone 4's camera can be as good as a point-and-shoot camera. IPhone 4's camera takes in relatively more light because the megapixel number of the camera's sensor increased but the size of each sensor speck remained the same. The result is that apicture taken with iPhone 4's 5 megapixel camera is not that far behind in quality compared to a picture taken with a regular compact point-and-shoot digital camera.

As an aside -- for the sake of providing more context -- I really like the camera on iPhone 3GS. Although it is only 3 megapixel, I only use the iPhone camera unless I have to take out the DSLR. I do that because there is hardly any "shutter lag," which is the time it takes to capture an image after the shutter is pressed. With other cell phone cameras, when the shutter is pressed when a child is smiling, the image captured is the child with his face turned away. That's about 0.5 seconds, which is a very long time as semi-serious photographers would know. DSLR takes the picture instantaneously when the shutter is pressed, but it is heavy and a chore to carry around all the time. For a person like me who takes a lot of pictures of children, this is a very considerate function. In contrast, other smartphone makers talk about the megapixel of their cameras but keep mum on shutter lag. Nor does iPhone particularly emphasize it -- you just know when you use it. Then iPhone users, instead of playing number games, create a word-of-mouth ad that says "You just know the difference once you use it." This is because Apple is a company that cares about how we use a machine.

This is how Apple makes a great product. Seeing Facetime after seeing the existing video conference that features low resolution and static-laden audio makes you widen your eyes with wonder. A video conference screen that sends images captured by a HD-capable camcorder is a functionality that redefines video conference. Facetime commercials nicely shows how Apple is accomplishing its mission of making a good product.

Compared to this, Galaxy S is not a great product. Although it receives praises of "best functionalities among all the Android phones thus far," it feels more like a well-rounded thing without a big flaw rather than the best. This is why it is difficult to imagine anyone who would stay up all night to buy Galaxy S, children who jump up and down with joy after receiving Galaxy S, or a friend who is on the verge of tears after receiving a Galaxy S as a gift.

But even the greatest product is meaningless if it is not there by your hands when you want to buy it. Therein lies the greatness of Samsung Electronics. It was reported that Samsung pre-ordered more than a million Galaxy S. Worldwide, 110 communications companies are planning to purchase Galaxy S, and Samsung plans to supply them all at the time they want the phones. In contrast, iPhone 4 will only be available in five countries (including the U.S.) by the end of June, 18 countires by the end of July, and even later for other countries. Until then, people cannot buy an iPhone no matter how much they want one. When the demand outstrips the supply, Samsung can conjure the magic of instantly increasing supply by expanding the production line for Product A into the production line that used to make Product B. Apple cannot do this. Instead, Apple takes reservation on the quantity of its products, gets its product based on that deadline, then increases the supply if the order increases. Although Apple is always late to respond to the market, it covers its weakness by its product's outstanding attractiveness. Apple even goes so far as to use the reactions of the waiting customers in its marketing.

In contrast, if the demand for its products is lukewarm, Samsung Electronics -- which runs its own factories -- simply changes the production line to produce something more popular. On average, Samsung only takes two months to re-educate its workers for the new line. Samsung's employees, who are divided into a number of ranks, always endeavor to become a higher-ranked engineers. Because the working environment is dynamic (in other words, not boring,) there is no employee who kills himself; in fact, the job satisfaction for Samsung's factory workers is on the high side. Furthermore, based on the market's reaction, Samsung adjusts the amount of production within 48 hours. It is not an exaggeration to say that Samsung has the world's quickest reaction time among global corporations. Apple cannot order Foxconn to adjust its production within 48 hours. If Apple did that, it would not be able to have the contract that allows for Apple to put out its products at this price. But Samsung makes a lot of cell phones other than smartphones; because Samsung orders so many parts, it can acquire components at prices as low as Apple's. Samsung also has a production system that is just as efficient as Foxconn. On top of this, Samsung has the advantage of an incredibly fast market-reaction-time that Apple-Foxconn combo would have difficulty achieving. The strength that makes Samsung great is this unique advantage that allows the company to make approximately similar products for cheaper price and put them out in the market when the customers want them. I think the company learned this strategy when it was battling Nokia.

Therefore, my belief is that while Samsung did not build a great product, it built a great factory. Even though it does not make an Anycall phone that drives customers mad with their desire to have, Anycall phones maintained the basic level of quality, were available at appropriate price, and existed at the time and place when the market wanted that product. Instead of trying to be the most innovative company, it seems as if Samsung is trying to be a company that will continue to be in second place even if the first place may change.

위대한 제품과 위대한 공장, 아이폰4와 갤럭시S의 차이점 [Alternative Hypothesis]

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Rabu, 23 Juni 2010

Only because commenter Goku asked, here is a little video of a nighttime activity that the Korean and the Korean Wife did on their honeymoon. The Korean will warn now that it gets a little freaky:

Ask a Korean! Wiki: Bikes?

The Korean just came back from his honeymoon with the Korean Wife, so let's ease back into things with a softball Wiki post:

Dear Korean,

Where can I get a decent bike around here? I'm a fairly serious rider and all I can find around here are overpriced Taiwanese made bicycles or super cheap hunks of steel being passed off as "MTB"s. I left my decent bikes in the States thinking I'd have choices over here but so far I've been unable to find anything comparable.

J


J, the last bicycle that the Korean had in Korea probably does not suit your taste, since it still had training wheels. Readers, any ideas?

Got any question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Sabtu, 05 Juni 2010

And with that, dear readers, the Korean is off to get married. He will be out of communication for the next three weeks or so. There will be no updates on the blog or replies to the emails -- unless, like everything else on this blog, the Korean feels like putting something up or responding to emails.

The Korean would like to thank you all for reading this humble blog. Be well, and keep the questions coming!

IMF Bailout of Korea During East Asian Financial Crisis (Part I)


Dear Korean,

I've often heard from my parents about the IMF-Korea bail out and how it was "actually" some big conspiracy that pushed Korea further into debt. They also mention how everyone in Korea united and melted their gold jewelry to pay off the debt. As much as I love my parents, I know they have rather slanted views when it comes to Korean history, economics, and/or politics. I would like to know, as objectively as possible, about the IMF-Korea bail out and how Koreans reacted to it and feel about it to this day.

2nd Generation


Dear 2nd Generation,

The Korean always found it a good policy to listen to someone who knows better than you do. So for this question, the Korean consulted with Wangkon936, who is a regular guest blogger at a popular Korea-related blog and far more knowledgeable about the East Asian Economic Crisis than the Korean himself, at least as far as the economics part is concerned.

Since this is a big topic, it will proceed in several parts. Wangkon936 will first discuss the mechanics of how the financial crisis started, followed by the Korean's discussion of the crisis' sociological impact Korean society. Below is Wangkon936.

*                *                *

It is not an exaggeration to say that East Asian Financial Crisis was a traumatic event for Korea. Not too long ago before the crisis, Korea became the 11th largest economy in the world and its per capita GDP had reached a milestone of $10,000.  The reform programs mandated by the IMF was humiliating to the country who had thought that they had turned a corner from decades of economic hardship and struggle and was close to reaching the exclusive club of the advanced economies of the world.

The sudden, almost hurricane or earthquake-like change in fortune was hard for most Koreans to bear, let alone understand.  So in an attempt to explain what they could not many Koreans viewed the crisis as being fueled by foreign speculators driving down the value of their currency, foreign lenders prematurely calling in their loans and a foreign IMF that did not care about the businesses they drove into bankruptcy, the people laid off from their jobs or the dreams of the people that all this sudden hardship destroyed.  Some desperate families, in dire economic straits, left their children at orphanages and these kids were called “IMF orphans.”  The acronym “IMF” in Korea became a symbol of every malaise that the country was going through at the time.  It literally became a new word in the Korean vocabulary as to many IMF stood for “I'M Fired.”

More after the jump.


Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.



East Asian Financial Crisis -- the Challenge of a Developing Economy

Korea was part of what many economists would call a “contagion.”  If you think that sounds a lot like the word “contagious” you are right.  An economic contagion is a situation where the economic problems of one nation, for reasons too complex to discuss in this blog, spread to another.  The crisis started in Thailand, then spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, The Philippines and South Korea.  These countries, to various degrees, fell like dominoes as their currencies were attacked by currency speculators and devalued. 

Developing countries, be it Mexico, Thailand or Korea of the 80's and 90's raised a lot of foreign debt so they could buy the means to develop.  In order for poor countries to raise their standard of living, they need to manufacture, mine or drill and pump out the things that developed countries want.  Sometimes these things are oil (the Middle East), raw diamonds and minerals (Africa), cars (Japan) or consumer products (China).  To extract oil or to make cars and consumer products you need machines and expertise that the developed countries have such as oil drills, metal stamping machines, lathes, sewing machines, injection molding machines, etc. otherwise known as “capital equipment.”  The only way a developed country will sell you capital equipment is if you buy it with their currency.  So, here is the developing country's fundamental challenge: one must borrow money from developed countries to buy their capital equipment then provide the developed countries with the goods they want so they will give you more of their currency so you can in turn raise your own productivity and pay off your debt to them.  A rather simplified model, but correct enough to suit our purposes here. 

The main problem for many developing countries is growth.  They must maintain strong growth rates otherwise it will be harder for them to pay off their debts to the developed countries.  Latin America has has mixed success to meeting this challenge.  For Africa it's largely been a disaster.  However, Japan succeeded spectacularly with this model and it looks like China is making good progress thus far.  From the 80's to the mid-90's the newly developing countries of East Asia were on a tear with annual growth rates between 7-9%, a blistering rate compared to the more sedate growth rates of 2-3% for the typical developed country.  However, by the mid-90's the newly developing East Asian countries were facing some problems.  Their strong grow rates were slowing because they had relied mostly on moving labor from the countryside and into the factories, but not in meaningful improvements in technology and efficiency.  To maintain their growth rates some of these countries started to “stretch” and take unnecessary risks. 

Let's take a step back and consider what this means. Suppose you own a factory with five workers, who make hand-woven baskets by hand. One way to improve your productivity (and create more baskets in the same amount of time) would be to hire additional basket weavers. Another way to improve your productivity would be to find an innovative way to weave baskets faster. East Asian economy grew primarily by adding more people without making as much innovation. (Again, this is all extremely simplified.) So when East Asian economies no longer had additional manpower to throw into the factories, problems began to boil up.

Case in pointThailand decided to build a lot of commercial buildings to encourage the development of business services such as a strong financial services sector like those that existed in Hong Kong and Singapore.  However, it wasn't working and all those newly built commercial properties had too many vacancies.  Thailand did try to “liberalize” its financial systems to help them develop faster and the get foreign financial institutions to move operations into their country, but that didn't work either. The Thais just didn't have the education base, experience or track record to develop a competitive financial services sector.   Because Thailand had a lot of real estate that was not bringing in revenue, their economy was full of what was called “non-performing loans" -- essentially, the loans that were not getting repaid by the borrowers. With a lot of overvalued properties and rising portfolio of non-performing loans the Thai economy slowed down. Thus, the Thai baht looked overvalued to currency speculators and they attacked, betting that the Thai government wouldn't have enough foreign currency to defend the baht. 

Currency Under Siege

Here, we need to understand a couple of concepts. One is short term loans.  Developing countries took on a lot of short term loans because they were considered riskier investments by the lenders of the developed world and are thus easier for developing countries to get.  The term of these loans are 12 months, meaning technically these loans need to be completely repaid within a year.  Most short-term loans are merely refinanced every year.  However, if the economic situation is unstable, given the greater risk of these short-term loans, banks can decide to not renew them and/or call them up early.

The other is foreign currency reserves, which are funds held by a nation's central bank (their version of a Federal Reserve) to stabilize their nation's currency.  For the purposes of understanding the concepts in this post, there is another function of foreign currency.  Think of it as the last reserve of having just in case your lender suddenly wants to its debt repaid ahead of schedule.  In other words, it's the last resource that a nation's central bank has in order to pay off their foreign debts if those debts suddenly and unexpectedly become due.  Think of it as a family's chest of jewelry that has quickly exchangeable value anywhere, at any time, just in case of an emergency to get you out of a pinch. So if the Thai baht or Korean won's value plummets, those respective countries can meet their short-term obligations to foreigners through their foreign currency reserves. 

Let us apply this to the Thailand situation. For ten years the Thai economy had enjoyed an average of 9.4% annual growth with only 4.7% inflation.  It looked like Thai was pulling an economic rabbit out of its hat.  But they weren't.  As mentioned before, the Thai economy by late 1996 had shown signs of strain.  It grew quickly and tried to maintain the fast growth rates, but had precariously stretched themselves which resulted in a commercial real estate bubble.  As the Thai economy slowed and strained its currency was attacked by currency speculators.

So, what's a currency speculator and why do they attack currencies?  To begin to answer these questions, we have to explore the question of what money really is.  Money nowadays has “intrinsic” value.  A dollar bill has no value in itself.  It's just paper and ink.  The value of money in the modern age is essentially what the market thinks it is.  Yes, this concept is strange when you sit down and think about it, but it wasn't always like this.  Up to about the  late 1970’s, the world had a “gold standard” where a unit of a country's currency was theoretically worth a declared amount of gold redeemable by the government.  The government's central bank would promise that an X amount of their currency would be worth a Y amount of gold.  Well, that ended in 1971.  So, since then a country's currency is whatever people think it is.  Alright, that might be a little bit of an exaggeration, but theoretically it is “guaranteed” or made “legal tender” by the country's ability to raise tax revenue, or in other words, reap productive and valuable resources from its citizens and businesses.  It's almost like a publicly exchangeable stock on an entire country.  My old college economics professors probably won't like that analogy, but it will suffice for now.

Currency speculators are needed in the marketplace.  They enable developing countries, like Thailand, to get foreign currency to buy foreign goods.  Likewise, they are needed to help foreign companies buy Thai currency so they can buy Thai products.  However, currency speculators are not around to just help people.  Like any financially minded commercial institution, they are around to make a profit.  Currency speculators make money on manipulating the “spread” or “arbitrage.”  In other words, buy one currency cheaper and sell it for a higher price.  They use derivatives and leverage to “amplify” their returns.  It took me a semester of international finance to figure out how they make massive amounts of money on derivatives based on currency fluctuations so there is no way I can explain it in a few sentences.  It is sufficient to know that foreign currency speculators can make a lot of money if it makes a lot of correct “bets” on a nation's currency.  If the bet is against a currency then this can accelerate the decline of that currency.  Although this concept may be difficult for many lay people to immediately comprehend, it's something that needs to be understood to some degree before one can properly appreciate what happened to Korea and the other newly developed East Asian economies at the time.

So, in any stock market, who determines the price?  Demand does.  The higher the demand the more “valued” the currency is.  What determines demand?  Investor confidence in the country.  Why would investors lose confidence in a country?  The same reason all investors lose confidence.  They lose confidence because the country may have a declining ability to meet its debt obligations.  So, in Thailand's case its debt rises, its economy slows and its real estate bubble begins to pop.  With those things going on people begin to doubt if the nation can pay its debt obligations to foreign lenders.

Thailand's currency, the baht, was under pressure in the early summer of 1997, as currency speculators attacked it by making “bets” that it was overvalued due to the underlying weakness of its economy.  The Thai central bank had no choice but to flood the market with foreign currency from their foreign currency reserves to buy back the baht that the currency speculators were dumping into the market.  They were thus “creating” demand to keep the value of their currency stable.  However, at this time Thailand's foreign currency reserves were modest and not enough to sufficiently counter the bets made against it by speculators.  With Thai's foreign currency reserves exhausted they could no longer maintain the peg to the major developed currencies and the value of the baht fell like a meteor.  With the baht's value dropping in half Thai's short term lenders panicked.  A sudden decline in a country's currency effectively multiplied the debt by how much the currency declines.  So if the currency declines in half, it effectively doubles the debt.  Thus, the mostly foreign short-term lenders either called in their loans early or said they wouldn't refinance the loans.  Thailand was in default and had to get a loan from the IMF to cover their short term debts.

However, the emergency IMF loans that helped the Thais to pay off their short term debt obligations didn’t come without its costs and consequences.  The IMF mandated, as a precondition to obtaining the loan, a balanced government budget, ample foreign currency reserves, controlled inflation, etc.  All these things sound good, but the problem was that the Thai government had to do implement all of this virtually immediately, which caused a good deal of austerity and hardship for its citizens and businesses.

Thus, this similar pattern spread to other formally fast growing East Asian economies as the contagion spread to Indonesia, then Malaysia and ripples were felt worldwide.  The last but largest casualty of the contagion was South Korea. How South Korea fell and what lead to its financial demise, if this demise was “fair” or “unfair,” and if external (i.e foreign) parties like the IMF had an undue responsibility will be the topic of part II.



Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com

Kamis, 03 Juni 2010

Ask a Korean! Wiki -- Korean Language Tutors?

Dear Korean,

The American English Professor Husband to Korean Woman and Father of a Very Cute Half Breed Kid with a Half English Half Korean Name (hereinafter referred to simply as "AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN") just read The Korean's blog post about learning languages. AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN agrees with the Korean, and gives Kudos to the hard-assed realism. People ask how AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN learned to speak good Arabic in just a year, and the only answer is pure hard work. (And AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN is a big fan of Pinker's book too.)

AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN has a question about language tutors. Can the Korean recommend any good tutors or language programs here in Seoul? Does the Korean himself tutor? AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN only has a few "free weeks" this summer, so Yonsei's lauded KSL program doesn't work for him. AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN asks forgiveness if this information is already on the Korean's blog.

With obsequious thanks to His Munificence, the Korean,
AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN

Dear AEPHKWFVCHBKHEHKN,

The Korean is glad you enjoyed the post. But he never had to learn Korean in Korea via tutoring, so he does not know at this time -- but he is sure some of AAK! readers will be able to help you. Readers, any ideas?

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.